Getting Out of the Gernsback Continuum Andrew Ross
The title of this essay refers to the cyberpunk writer William Gibson's first published story "The Gernsback Continuum," whose narrator, a free-lance photographer, has been hired to shoot 1930s futuristic North American architecture for the British nostalgia publishers' market. The streamlined design of factory buildings, gas stations, diners, and movie marquees-finned, flanged, and fluted-recalls a future perfect that never was, a tomorrow's world fully planned and designed by technophiles faithful to the prewar ethic of progressive futurism. From the sleek rockets on the "spray-paint pulp utopias" of the Frank R. Paul covers of Amazing Stories magazine to the winged statues that guard the Hoover Dam, the story was of a promised future that would come into being only as a nightmare; the rockets were those that fell on London during the war, the streamlined cars and crystal superhighways gave the green light to postwar ecological atrocities committed by General Motors under the aegis of petroleum capitalism.1
In the course of his photo assignment, Gibson's narrator is haunted by the "semiotic ghost" of these outdated futures, chunks of "deep cultural imagery" from the "mass unconscious" that take on part hallucinatory, part material form as he travels around Southern Californiaa flying-wing luxury liner, gleaming eighty-lane highways, shark-fin roadsters; a city with ziggurats, zeppelin docks, giant neon spires; and a Getting Out of the Gernsback Continuum account of the formal history of the changing rules of generic conventions, understood and fully absorbed by historically conscious writers, readers, and fans within the SF community. Knowledge of these historical changes forms the "tradition" of a literary genre, inherited and used by its practitioners and cognoscenti. However, the linear conventions of this narrative tend to deflect our attention from the story, naive or not, that SF also tells about the place of science and technology in society at any one time. Consequently, the form of this narrative is less useful to cultural historians who are interested in examining the role of SF in the material culture of a particular historical moment. It is especially difficult to write about the early years of a genre without falling prey to the knowledge that one is talking about "origins" that will then be "superseded" in the later history of the genre. All historians confront this problem to some extent. Historians of a cultural genre are particularly constrained by knowledge about the subsequent development of the genre. In the case of early SF, the conventional historical narrative is often overlaid by prejudices against the North American vulgarization of the high-minded and socially critical European SF tradition created by intellectual giants like H. G. Wells, Jules Verne, Aldous Huxley, Yevgeny Zamyatin, Fritz Lang, Olaf Stapledon, Karel Capek, Franz Kafka, and C. S. Lewis. According to Brian Aldiss, the lowbrow American pulps were marketed as mere "propaganda for the wares of the inventor," where "screwdrivers substitute for vision" and where a standardized and "debased ... product" is churned out of "sweatshops" of the mind.3 For Aldiss, the high European SF of the thirties grappled with the global zeitgeist-the rise of National Socialism and the fledgling specters of bureaucratic statism-while the lowly "bathetic" trade of the pulps was devoted solely to uncritical and unspeculative technojingoism, or to the crude, chauvinist Americanization of its largely immigrant readership.
Leaving aside the prejudicial bent of this description, one could still argue that Aldiss does the zeitgeist of the thirties a disservice by assuming that it flowed only through the refined synapses of European literary minds. The ideological backdrop to the pulps-the technocratic conflicts over the control and (mis)management of industrial production in a liberal democracy-harbored many of the ultimately decisive postwar solutions to the growing antagonisms between labor and capital. The postwar social contract that secured the long period of Fordist growth in the Western democracies proved to be a more resilient and efficient response to these antagonisms than the ideological cocktail of progressive modernization and reactionary folk nationalism that was the vehicle of European fascism, especially in the German version. In retrospect, technocratic Fordism and fascism were alternative solutions to the problems that capitalism faced in the thirties.
If the SF pulp authors of the twenties and thirties had little occasion to address directly the highly charged role of technology in the social drama of their time, they nonetheless owed their literary raison d'etre to the cults of science and technological invention that embellished a positivist religion (shared by left and right alike) in the years between the world wars. The pulp rhetoric of unstinting faith in the progressive virtues of science ranged across a wide social spectrum: this rhetoric was used by popular entrepreneurs like Gernsback, management reformers like Frederick Winslow Taylor, Progressive engineering professionals like Morris Cooke, business leaders and governing figures like Herbert Hoover and Theodore Roosevelt, nonmarxist technocrats like Thorstein Veblen and Lewis Mumford, and could be found even at the core of the organized revolutionary left among those committed to the inevitability of "scientific socialism." To see this widely shared social fantasy as a naive example of blind faith in technological progress is not good enough; such judgments are part of our own naive response to history. Technocracy and Fordism were just as enthusiastically received by the European left (Antonio Gramsci says it all in "Americanism and Fordism"),4 who saw these principles as applied modernist antidotes to fascist folk mysticism. To explain the significance of early SF, I will argue that we are obliged to substitute for given wisdom about SF's "uncritical technophilia" a more historical account of its place within a moment of critical technocracy.
So, too, any properly historical analysis of the early years of the genre ought to challenge the enduring assumption that pulp magazine production was an assembly-line culture designed to force-feed a passive population a reactionary diet of escapist sensation. The market dynamics behind SF genre formation were indeed part and parcel of the pulp publishing revolution that created specialized audiences for detective fiction, spy fiction, horror fiction, Western fiction, romance fiction, and others in the interwar years. But SF deserves attention as a special case if only because of the extraordinary role played by its amateur fans. It is still the only cultural genre where the literary activities of its fans-in fanzines, gatherings, and conferences-far outnumber the published output of the genre's professional writers. This obsessional amateur subculture came to mediate the pulp magazines' appeal to a popular audience at every level: questioning, challenging, and contesting editorial power; determining the shape and success of Getting Out of the Gernsback Continuum certain magazines; and producing writers and editors from its ranks who, versed in the often politicized dialogue of fandom in the thirties, rapidly rose to transform the direction of the genre as a whole.
The most celebrated group of fans in this period were known as the Futurians (including such soon-to-be-famous names as Isaac Asimov, Donald Wollheim, Frederik Pohl, C. M. Kornbluth, andJudith Merril), some of whom were associated with the Young Communist League and who did a good deal of not-very-successful socialist recruiting among SF fans by employing arguments drawn from well-known SF dystopias in which fascist orders prevailed. Active in small groups with names like the Committee for the Political Advancement of Science Fiction, their watchword was "the theory of science-fiction action," tied to the socialist ideal of the science of social "progress."5 Consequently, their conception of science was much broader than that encompassed by Gernsback's philosophy, although they shared his penchant for recruitment. While they would soon change the shape of the genre as professional writers and editors in their own right, the critical activities of these fans served as a kind of counterculture operating against the editorial establishment. Their injection of social consciousness into the world of fandom had an enduring effect at a time when the pulp stories were only just beginning to address the future of authoritarian social orders. Anti-Gernsbackian in their commitment to seeing SF as a socially aware genre rather than as an opportunity to further the cause of science, these fans cultivated the romance of the boy fiction-inventor at the expense of the cult of the boy hardware-inventor.
Hugo's Hard Line
To explicate fully what is meant by the "Gernsback Continuum," we need to look first at Gernsback's own role in publishing and in "fathering" the genre. Pulp publishing, said to have begun with Frank Munsey's all-story Argosy magazine in 1896, was a revolution in industrial mass production that capitalized on North America's vastly increased immigrant population, literacy rates, rural postal delivery, and urbanization.6 When pulp publishing was at its height in the late thirties, there were over two hundred pulps with over twenty-five million readers distributed across a wide social spectrum. Popular Publications, for instance, claimed to have had both Al Capone and Harry Truman as subscribers.7 Isaac Asimov recalls how his immigrant father, a candy store owner, despised the pulps he sold as trash, but often read them to improve his English.8
In the pulp star system, it was usually the magazines, or their formulae, and seldom the writers themselves (however highly paid), who were the major actors. For the SF cognoscenti, it was the magazine editors who played the starring role; consequently, it is Gernsback and John Campbell, editor of Astounding Stories from 1937-71, who are commemorated as the "fathers" of science fiction, not Verne, Wells, Capek, or E. E. "Doc" Smith. It is clear, moreover, that Gernsback's "invention" of the genre, with the appearance of his pulp magazine Amazing Stories in 1926, is markedly different from, say, Munsey's fathering of the all-story pulp, or Street & Smith's creation of the specialized genre of crime-and-detection fiction with the publication of Detective Story Magazine in 1915. This is not to say that the private detective story, with its origins in Allan Pinkerton's dime-novel memoiradventures of the West, was any less an original "American" genre than the gadget fetishism of the Gernsbackian story, with its roots in the "invention hero" dime novels like the Frank Reade Weekly, the hamradio culture, and the popular boy-inventor culture of the turn of the century.9 But, unlike Munsey, an ex-telegraph operator turned publishing entrepreneur, Gernsback's own life story was exemplary of the starring role cast for the free-lance inventor in the popular formulae he established as the generic "hard science" core of SF. In an age of collective corporate management, Gernsback's hands-on ownership and editorial role in the "invention" and early production of SF was a throwback to the individualist inventor-entrepreneur of an earlier era a la Thomas Edison. T. O'Conor Sloane, Gernsback's first managing editor at Amazing Stories, an inventor and scientist in his own right, happened to be Edison's son-in-law as well.10 Gernsback's rugged individualism went against the grain of the increasingly Taylorized culture industry, just as the inventor-wizards who starred in the pulp SF stories had become an anachronism in the corporate research world of Bell Labs.
As a promoter of the ham-radio craze in the first two decades of the century, Gernsback had already been at the center of another amateur culture long before he "created" the amateur fandom at the By the time Gernsback's unwavering efforts to promote popular science came to include the first magazine devoted to science fiction in 1926, it was perhaps only with feigned surprise that, in the third issue of the magazine, he reacted to "'the tremendous amount of mail we receive from-shall we call them "Scientifiction Fans"?' " (E, p. 236). In the prespecialized days of all-story magazines, it had already been established that there was a large readership for the kind of "gosh-wow!" stories that Gernsback printed (Amazing Stories would soon have a readership of 100,000). As a result, his novel attempt to recruit for the "cause" of popular science through pulp literature generated a cult-like following of boys willing to be enlisted in the service of the new cause. In fact, it was the crusading zeal with which Gernsback's SF publications promoted scientific education and recruitment that served to demarcate the genre of the SF story from the whole field of fantasy stories, out of which the SF story itself grew and continued to flourish in competing pulps like Weird Tales.
If the function of Gernsback's "scientifiction" was to consolidate popular education about science and technical knowledge, then the literary tendency to encourage formal "invention," especially of the sort that led to flights of fictional fancy, had to be subject to a restrictive principle. Indeed, the tension between technical invention and literary invention stretches across the whole history of science fiction: Verne once said famously of Wells's stories that they "'do not repose on very scientific bases. ... I make use of physics. He invents.' "12 All popular genre fiction tends to have its own formal rules that guard against overinventiveness, but in the case of SF, the distinction between "using science" and "inventing" lay at the very heart of genre formation for other than formalistic reasons. To make his rules stick-to demarcate his genre of stories from those of his competitors-Gernsback created a whole supervisory apparatus to guarantee to readers the "technical plausibility" and accuracy to scientific fact of the prophetic stories he published under such slogans as " Gernsback also fought long and hard, in a highly competitive arena, to permanently attach his agenda of technical plausibility and hard science to a generic term for the specialty field. This term, "science fiction," emerged only after a long contest waged between competing magazines like Argosy, Weird Tales, and Astounding Stories over terms like "pseudoscientific stories," "scientifiction," "weird-scientific stories," "off-trail stories," "fantascience," "super science," and others (E, pp. 313-33). Of course, the contest over the definitive term had high commercial stakes in the subscription game, but it was also part of a search, in the pulp world, for a stable, legitimate standard 13. Quoted in Paul A. Carter, The Creation of Tomorrow: Fifty Years of Magazine Science Fiction (New York, 1977), p. 11. Getting Out of the Gernsback Continuum around which the loyalty of fans and readers could be mobilized. Long after 1934, the year when Astounding Stories, Gernsback's chief competitor, was reorganized and began to dominate the field, Gernsback's rules of play concerning the centrality of the hard physical sciences continued to hold sway. Story lines diversified. Orlin Tremaine, then the editor of Astounding Stories, introduced the more metaphysical "thought-variant" story. Campbell, Tremaine's maverick successor, encouraged his famous stable of writers to try more speculative, psychohistorical, and even sociological treatments. In the fifties, Campbell allowed his writers to investigate the fields of psi, dianetics, and parapsychology. Even in Gernsback's heyday, a number of fanciful scientific "errors" were tolerated as "superscience" conventions in order to explain the interstellar plausibility of the generic "space opera," pioneered by E. E. Smith in The Skylark of Space (1928). For the most part, however, the gatekeeper-editors at the head of the field stuck to the positivist line as an issue of fundamental policy until well into the fifties, when dystopian critiques of the religion of "progress" through science and technology began to predominate in a field founded on the idea of progressive futurism, the dominant discourse of its day.
Gernsback often used the fandom he had helped create to regulate these hard science policies. For example, the second issue of Amazing Stories carried a Gernsback editorial that cited a letter from George Anderson of Fairmount, West Virginia, suggesting that the magazine should "print all scientific facts as related in the stories in italics. This will serve to more forcefully drive home the idea upon which you have established your magazine."'4 Other readers would complain that the stories were too scientific and that more attention ought to be paid to literary style. Although neither suggestion was implemented, the typical Gernsbackian story of adventures through gadgetry would always feature moments in which the genius-inventor took time to explain at length, often in isolated and stylistically unrefined paragraphs, the science that he was employing to save the world.
Critics of Gernsbackianism have charged that Gernsback's devotion to the pragmatic, hardware-oriented tradition of invention was a formula for technological fiction only and had little to do with a properly scientific fiction that fully questioned the nature of the objective world. In the years before SF was established generically, the new quantum physics, for example, had been exploring the heady qualities of a newly implausible universe. At the core of the Gernsback formula, however, was a populist principle that science could be explained and understood by everyone, and that its name would not be associated with exclusive rhetorical idioms or with obfuscatory accounts of the object world by overaccredited experts. For Gernsback, scientific language, in particular, was a universal language of progress that ought to be accessible to anyone without a college degree. Indeed, the straightforward prose of early SF contrasts with the rich American argot of local dialects found in the Western and hard-boiled genres. Its undeveloped style is equally distinct from the luxurious hand of the likes of H. P. Lovecraft, whose overwritten fantasies crammed the pages of Weird Tales. All the same, there were dialects to be heard in Gernsbackian fiction, specifically those of the alien species who were typically vilified in the most overtly racist ways. Since women rarely appeared in pulp SF, this "universal" language of science was, in practice, for white boys and men only. It functioned as a mark of their superiority in coping with conditions in exotic localities like Mars or Venus, whose climates were simply displaced from the popular action-adventure regions of the arid West and tropical Africa respectively. So, too, the jargon of "positronic rays" and "electronic vibration adjusters" quickly became the mark of an insider language that readers and fans could learn to cultivate as the language of experts, eventually producing their own subcultural variant in the unique idiom of fanspeak. Although the "universal" language of science and rationality popularized in pulp SF was limited to a rather narrow, white male view, it could still be construed as a populist refusal of the elitist vehicles of "literary" speech and "metaphysical" discourse that had traditionally governed the definition of universality in Western literate culture. Indeed, the belated recognition of SF as a literary genre by technophobic humanists was a consequence of its perceived challenge to that tradition of humane discourse. The spare, economical language of technorationality, everywhere valorized in the twenties and thirties as the official language of the latest version of North American pragmatism, embodied the austerity measures that were also favored by much of high modernist culture. One thinks of the ascendancy of the maxim "form follows function" in art, design, and architecture, or the rhetorical economy of Ezra Pound's imagism, in which excess was condemned as "wasteful." Many of the formal principles that lay behind the modernist movement can be seen as a literal translation of the efficiency techniques of Taylorism. The new technocratic principles of stark efficiency, tight economy, and hard precision had come to fill the role vacated by the eschewal of ornament and the rejection of conspicuous expenditure associated with the wasteful style of high bourgeois culture in the late nineteenth century. These utilitarian conventions were broadly welcomed, in culture and social thought, for their appeal to the principles of democratic modernization.
Alternately, the history of the adoption and incorporation of utilitarian conventions into antidemocratic philosophies in the course of the 1930s is well known, especially in the case of European high modernism, many of whose adherents followed the road to fascism without having to beat a retreat from their politics of style. In German SF, where a specialized mass genre of SF did not exist, Nazi ideology was nourished by the Aryan-mythological elements of "Teutonic" fantasy fiction, by the purified spiritual histories espoused by various occult science groups, and even by the activities of the Society for SpaceFlight, whose amateur experiments with rocketry were lionized in the American pulps throughout the thirties. The National Socialist fusion of precapitalist pastoralism, technological modernization, and millenarian futurism were all fully present in the German SF culture of the time.'5 Arguably, however, the best examples of Nordic-Aryan adventure fiction could be found in the North American pulps during these years. The historical continuity of these stories with the colonial romance of the Western served to reaffirm whatever codes of nationalistic destiny were still at work in the formula. The colonial romances of the new high-tech adventure formula had to take place in foreign locations; they could not be pursued in the squalid urban conditions familiar to the modern, technointensive labor force. In this respect, North American SF was much more than a naive reflection of the cult of technology; it was also an embryonic response to the call for the colonization of space, where adventure, as always, was imperialism's accomplice. The language of colonization was the sparse instrumentality of scientific boyspeak with an American accent, just as the lingua franca of science among earthlings today is American English.
In the fledgling struggles over genre formation in the SF of the twenties and thirties, what we can see is an attempt to establish a language that signified scientific rationality (what is science if it is not a self-legislating language?) and to eliminate a language that privileged romance, fantasy, and literary invention, except, of course, where the romance was that of science and technology.'6 In its quarrel with fantasy fiction, popular SF was as actively committed to this crusade as the modernist movement was to purging the rhetorical vestiges of romanticism. Today, the opposition between science and rhetoric is no longer as clearly defined. While the origin story of science is still told in opposition to the humanist tradition of rhetoric, in recent years critics have come to see science itself as just another form of rhetoric with particularly aggressive claims to make on objectivity. In literary prac-tice, of course, Gernsback's purist devotion to the rhetoric of hard science was everywhere open to adulteration, as the genre could not stand still if it was to be true to the spirit of fictional, or even scientific, invention. A literary commodity that traded on its "amazing" and "astounding" qualities was even less likely than other forms to be able to toe the hard line against rhetorical excess.
Engineers' Dreams
For the most part, rationalist technospeak is the language we associate today with the term "technocrat," the language that has come to dominate the bureaucracies of business, government, education, and military diplomacy. Today this language signifies impersonality and inhumanity, the technocrat's cross to bear. By contrast, in the twenties and thirties, it was the language of modernity and progress. All advocates of social action were obliged to emulate it, for it was the language of efficiency, even when it seemed long-winded and opaque. The universal claim of the countercultures of the day-whether socialist, technocrat, populist, or avant-garde-was that they could speak this language more proficiently than the dominant culture. While sharing the dominant values of modernity and progress, these countercultures promised to be more creative, more productive, more efficient, more growth-oriented, and more humane than the fettered capitalist management of society was proving to be.
In the thirties, technocracy could still be a radical word, as it was not yet associated with soulless bureaucratic rationality. Technocracy was also the name of a short-lived popular movement, forged in the crisis years of the Depression. This movement, whose history is very colorful, demanded a complete replacement of the economy's dependence on commodity value with a system based on the full use of available energy resources and technologies. Despite this eccentric and impractical suggestion, the Technocracy movement was asking many of the right questions about automation and technological unemployment, the rationalized use of expertise and management over the arbitrary diktat of capital, industrial democracy, production for use and not for profit, and the nonutopian horizon of a postscarcity culture. The movement, which lived and died by the sword of its scientific analysis of energy conservation, eventually developed its own weird protofascist trappings (while being strictly antifascist), complete with regulation suits, armbands, paramilitary salutes, motorcycle corps, and even a youth group called the Farads."17 Getting Out of the Gernsback Continuum The solutions offered by the Technocracy movement looked back to the earlier progressivism of the engineers reform movement from which it derived. At its roots was the vanguardist role Thorstein Veblen cast for the engineer. Going back even further, there were links with the Midwestern agrarian populists, who had excoriated absentee landlords for their distant mismanagement of agricultural production. In many ways, the story of the technocratic idea-from the so-called "revolt of the engineers" during the teens to the media-hyped Technocracy movement of the thirties-was more representative of domestic U.S. culture between the wars than the romance of American Communism, although it is the less well known of the two stories. Arguably, the appeal of Technocracy to native populism and to philosophical pragmatism (jokes about the "dictatorship of the engineers" notwithstanding) held more sway over popular antibusiness consciousness than the prePopular Front image of a "Soviet America," which was so captivating to Europeanized intellectuals of the time. Inspired by the romantic engineer-adventurers of popular film and fiction like The Trail of the Lonesome Pine and Soldiers of Fortune (these engineer-heroes were figures not unlike the modern Indiana Jones), and helped along by the pioneer cult of rugged individualism, engineering became a messianic vocation in the first three decades of the century. Technological progress was raised to the status of a self-evident truth, and the cults of efficiency and waste conservation presided over everyday life. Even women in the home were addressed as the engineers or scientific managers of their households: toward the end of the teens, "Training the Home Engineer" and "Running the Home Like a Factory" were typical lead articles in popular magazines like Woman's Home Companion.'8 So pervasive was the moral category of efficiency that Veblen's idea for a revolutionary "soviet of technicians," who would take control of the economy and sweep away the inefficient price system, was received as a respectable proposition in many circles in 1920. Veblen's idea was particularly well received in business circles, since it was rather hostile to labor interests (class conflict was too "wasteful" to be scientific). Veblen and other technocrats posed science and business as good and bad angels respectively, two conflicting demands on the engineer's vocational conscience.19 By the twenties, however, science had long been the governing genius of industrial production, and technological progress, as applied science, had become the primary rationale for capitalist growth. The crisis tendencies of capitalist overproduction were now held in check, of course, by the principles of scientific management. In other words, there was virtually no de facto opposition The utopian city is named Jonbar, after John Barr, the boy inventor, and is dominated by a huge statue of Wil McLan, the mathematician who figures prominently in the series as the heroic inventor of an atomic-powered time ship that allows the adventurers to navigate between the alternate futures. In the scientifically administered future city, these rugged individuals from the past are honored in various memorial forms while the scientists of the day are strictly technocratic; they are "brisk and efficient," and as undifferentiated as their correlates in the alternate evil future-an urban army of giant, hypertrophied ants. In this respect, one could say that the far future more clearly resembles the scientific milieu of Williamson's present, honorifically organized around corporations bearing the names of their inventor-founders.
It would be critically reductive to say that such stories were simply anachronistic, that they were symptoms of a lazy, determinist lag between the soloist culture of boy's adventure fiction and the corporate world of social and industrial reality, and that the fiction would eventually catch up. Alternately, it is too facile to see the world-saving, geniusinventor type as a critical response, however politically unconscious, to monopoly capitalism's incorporation of science. After all, most popular fiction (in contrast to middlebrow and highbrow fiction) depends on the narrative vehicle of strong audience identification with individual character types, while its ideological appeal often rests on nostalgia for traditional, or mythical, forms of knowledge and social action. But SF, especially in the thirties, made a special case for itself as an "advanced" genre of popular entertainment, a genre concerned with new, cuttingedge, even prophetic forms of knowledge and social action in the present and in the future. Consequently, the contradictions it displayed as a bearer of the new technocratic ideology had a claim on modernity that other generic popular fiction was not in a position to share or to match.
The survival of the erector set-inspired amateur inventor as a type in thirties SF, even though it was anachronistic, meant that this heroic figure became available as a protopolitical vehicle. Not unlike the celebrated "small guy" in Frank Capra's films of the time, the figure was used to express some kind of defiant alternative to the stifling assemblyline spirit of corporate labor. In both cases, Capra's and Gernsback's, the appeal was ostensibly populist, and eventually, in Capra's case at least, antifascist, in keeping with the spirit of the Popular Front in the mid-to late thirties. In an age of high anxiety about technological unemployment, the inventor's autonomy over the creative use of gadgetry was an attractive alternative to the feeling of loss of mastery over technology to the new corporate technostructure. This feeling extended from the shop floor, where the skills embodied in workers' rules of thumb had been coopted by the new Taylorist managers, to the cockpits, if we believe their complaints, of the old-style captains of industry.
So, too, if we take Gernsback's agenda of recruitment literally, we can see that a diet of pulp SF may have been an appealing advertisement for the social virtues of doing science, but it was a poor preparation for likely industrial draftees. Youthful readers whose hopes were flattered by the Gernsbackian tendency to highlight the more attractive, utopian elements of the new technocratic ideology, to emphasize the creative rather than the instrumental side of technical reason, had every chance of seeing those hopes dashed in the employment market of the time. When one is raised on a diet of "astonishing," "amazing," and "wondrous" adventures through scientific endeavor, the prospects of being thrilled by the drudgery of employment in the everyday factories of science and technology were very slim indeed. In a similar way, the adventures of time travel and space travel, the standard imperialistic components of pulp SF, might also be seen as utopian versions of the desire to escape the new Taylorist tyranny of organized and quantified time and space that had come to preside over the contemporary workplace.
Like the genius-inventor, the cowboy and the private detective were anachronistic heroes increasingly employed to criticize the loss of individual autonomy in a bureaucratically organized corporate culture. In the decade before the New York World's Fair, SF had been part of the cultural process of popular consent that helped to grant the autonomy commanded by these corporate forms, and that ultimately endowed the likes of GM with powers that soon came to preside without ecological foresight over the nuclear militarization of aerospace and the carbon-intensive automobilization of ground space. But it seems quite reductive to hold pulp SF's aesthetic of "progress" to account for its apparent complicity in the corporate version of the Gernsback Continuum. The history of the genre formation of SF, as I have briefly described it here, was certainly intimate with dominant ideas about science as instrumentally self-justifying. But it was also responsive to "amazing" ideas about the future of science and technology that went well beyond the limited purview of industrial capitalism, stretching those limits into unmanageable realms of social invention that could never possibly be met by the subsequently deflationary reality of everyday technology. Once it has abolished utopias by announcing the end of ideology, corporate technocracy has to deliver what it promisesincremental raises in consumer gratification-or it is found wanting. SF culture is not part of that risky game. Its futures provide ample room for alternative forms of gratification. Even in those early years, when SF most embodied the technocratic spirit, there was a close link to what I have described as critical technocracy, an attempt, in its heyday at least, to change the rules of the game that have governed GM's idea of technological progress.
The exploitationist side of the World of Tomorrow capitalized on the hopes of a depressed population slowly coming out of the grip of the Depression. But the other side of the Gernsback Continuum, which I have tried to describe here, was complicit with three decades of progressive thinking about technology's capacity to weld the future and progress together into one social shape. The aesthetic form of this continuum between future and progress had found its most visible expression in streamlined industrial design-the smooth dynamics of an inevitable horizontal movement of energy, insistently fluid, with no obstacles in its rounded path towards a future. Friction-free, energyefficient, and seductively constructed around the attractive surfaces of Bakelite, Vitrolite, and newly synthesized plastics, this representation of the hygienic speed of tomorrow became the visual language of progress in the thirties, a sign that the future, to cite a favorite streamline pun, was just "rounding the corner." Pulp SF, which boasted the utopian, streamlined, teardrop look on every magazine cover, was one of the more popular versions of an aesthetic that signified a genre going somewhere fast. Like the streamline designers, who thought that basic units like the teardrop were Platonic forms, essentially perfect solutions to all design problems in the future, the Gernsbackian version of futurism was untroubled by its ideological assumptions about the unilinear shape of the future. Both aesthetics would fall victim to the new logics of obsolescence, social and stylistic, with which art moderne was industrially associated. The "future" look would soon be out of fashion, proving, perhaps, that the future really was a continuum and illustrating one of those time paradoxes of which SF is so fond. The Gernsback Continuum would ultimately leave Gernsbackianism behind. Of course, there were reasons other than the innovations of industrial design and fashion for the obsolescence of futurism. War, and Hiroshima in particular, gave the future a bad name. But while it lasted, and until it was hired to sell the corporate definition of the American way of life at the New York World's Fair, the streamlined Gernsback future had been a "natural" expression of progressive thinking about a better society.
At a time when science and technology were becoming the primary rationales for capitalist growth, technocrats, socialists, and progressives each assumed, in a publicly visible way, that they were the historical heirs to a tradition of technological futurism, a tradition not at all adequately described by today's derogatory term "technophilia." For technocrats, it was a tradition in which expertise, rationality, and knowledge would challenge the arbitrary diktat of capital; for socialists, it was a tradition in which the technological forces of production would undermine the existing social order even as they reinforced it; and for progressives, it was a tradition in which technology was the ally of democratization and the enemy of limited production for profit.
It is not fair to assume, in our own prematurely conscientious green days (when Gernsbackian stories about the redemptive wonders of high technology are presented, just as unfaithfully, in the name of "clean," ecologically enhanced futures), that the heirs to these traditions were simply not ecologically minded. Exemplary thinkers like Mumford insisted on seeing technologies in the context of a general social ecology. Mumford, who had a typical Gernsbackian youth, not only drew on the conservation movement of Progressivism, which ultimately produced such fine critiques as Stuart Chase's The Tragedy of Waste (1925), but also on the garden city and regional planning movements, which leaned towards the decentralized pastoralism preached by the Russian anarchist Pyotr Kropotkin and the Scottish utopian Patrick Geddes. In Technics and Civilization (1934), Mumford produced the most representative document of progressive technocratic thought of the thirties. In that grand survey of Western technological cultures, he
